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RECEN TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES HAVE made pe-diatric organ transplantation possible in infants. Technology
has provided the means by which the medical profession may
artificially sustain life to prolong an infant's dying process, or
to preserve organs for later transplantation. Amidst the emo-
tional controversies over abortion, the right to life, and the
"right to die," it has been debated whether the 1000 to 2000
anencephalic infants born annually in the United States'
should become organ donors prior to their natural deaths.
Many parents, physicians, ethicists, and politicians have
targeted anencephalic infants as a potential solution to the
problem of pediatric organ shortages.2 Proponants argue that
t B.A., Miami University, 1992; J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, 1995. The author thanks Professor Maxwell J. Mehlman for serving as the
faculty supervisor of this Note. The opinions expressed in this Note are solely those of the
author.
1. Committee on Bioethics, Infants With Anencephaly as Organ Sources: Ethical
Considerations, 89 PEDIATRICS 1116, 1116 (1992). Even eight years ago, statistics showed
that up to 3000 anencephalic infants were born annually with 1 in every 1000 births. See
Alexander M. Capron, Anencephalic Donors: Separate the Dead from the Dying, HAs-
TINGS CENTER RaP., Feb. 1987, at 5 (stating that according to Godfrey Oakley of the
Centers of Disease Control, between 2000 and 3000 anencephalic infants are born each
year). However, in the past few years, as many as 95 % of anencephalic infants have been
aborted upon early diagnosis during pregnancy. Frank A. Chervenak & Margaret A. Far-
ley et al., When Is Termination of Pregnancy During the Third Trimester Morally Justifi-
able?, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (1984) (stating that anencephaly is one of the few
conditions in which an abortion may be performed even during the third trimester); D.
Alan Shewmon et al., The Use of Anencephalic Infants as Organ Sources, A Critique, 261




the vitality of the anencephalic infants' organs, the certainty of
imminent death, and the desire of parents to save the life of
another child make anencephalic infants ideal organ donors.3
While use of anencephalic infants may seem like a simple solu-
tion to the short supply of pediatric organs, it poses many legal,
ethical, and medical problems. Because of these concerns, no
bill has been enacted on either the federal or state level author-
izing anencephalic infants to become live organ donors under
any circumstances." For the most part, the medical profession
favors preserving the sanctity of human life. Most doctors pro-
scribe treating anencephalic infants with "comfort care" 5 for
the duration of their lives, allowing family members to donate
the infants' organs at the time of natural death.6
This Note will outline the legal, ethical, and medical con-
cerns associated with procuring organs from live anencephalic
infants. Part I will provide a brief definition of anencephaly.
Part II will discuss the legal and ethical ramifications of ex-
tracting human organs before natural death. Part III will ex-
3. See, e.g., Jay A. Friedman, Taking the Camel by the Nose: The Anencephalic as
a Source of Pediatric Organ Transplants, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 921-22 (1990) (stating
that anencephalic infants are particularly ideal organ donors because their organs, other
than the brain, develop normally); Joyce L. Peabody et al., Experience With Anencephalic
Infants as Prospective Organ Donors, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 344, 344 (1989) (stating
that the certainty of death, accuracy of diagnosis, and desires of parents in assisting chil-
dren in need of organ transplants have made anencephalic infants attractive as potential
sources of pediatric organs). The American Medical Association also has endorsed organ
donations from anencephalic infants. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ameri-
can Medical Assoc., "The Use of Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors," 273 JAMA
1614 (1995).
4. See Kathleen L. Paliokas, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: An Assess-
ment of Death and Legislative Policy, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 206 (1989) (stating
no bill has successfully passed into state law allowing anencephalic organ procurement).
5. The generally accepted medical standard of care requires that anencephalic in-
fants be treated with the "comfort care" of warmth, nutrition, and hydration until death
occurs naturally. It is not required that anencephalic infants be provided aggressive treat-
ment to extend their lives based upon their underlying neural defect since the defect is
incurable and treatment is medically futile. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLE4S ON MEDICINE & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LE-
GAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT] (finding that it is in the infant's best interests to withhold
"clearly futile treatment"). In re Baby "K" (Three Cases), 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); see also James W. Walter & Stephen Ashwal, Organ
Prolongation in Anencephalic Infants: Ethical and Medical Issues, 18 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 19.
6. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 3, 8a U.L.A. 47 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (providing
guidelines for family members when making anatomical gifts of a decedent's organs).
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amine four medical proposals for preserving the bodies of
anencephalic infants in an attempt to prevent organ deteriora-
tion before transplantation, and will discuss the medical obsta-
cles to anencephalic infants becoming feasible organ donors.
I. THE DEFINITION OF ANENCEPHALY
Anencephaly is a serious congenital defect of unknown
cause in which infants are born without a cerebral cortex and
often without a cranium. They are born with only a brain stem,
restricting mobility to only the limited functions of the auto-
nomic nervous system, including breathing, digestion, circula-
tion, sucking, swallowing, crying, and reflexively responding to
stimuli. Since anencephalic infants lack their cerebral hemi-
spheres, they are incapable of consciously sensing pain or
achieving any higher brain activity as cognitive thought. Most
anencephalic infants have a very short life span of hours, days,
or just a few weeks. Few survive beyond the first year.7 Forty
percent of anencephalic infants are stillborn, and of the re-
mainder, 65 % die during the first day of life, 30 % die by the
end of the first week, and only 1.5 % live as long as one month.8
Quite obviously, anencephalic infants are extremely debilitated
and they exist in a permanently unconscious and vegetative
state. However, since they are able to sustain respiration and
heartbeat without medical intervention, these infants are not
considered "dead" or even "brain dead" under current legal
and medical standards.9 Rather, even with their objectively low
7. See, e.g., Committee on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 1116; Norman Fost, Organs
from Anencephalic Infants: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 18 HASTINGS
CENrER REP., Oct.-Nov. 1989, at 5, 6; Julie Koenig, The Anencephalic Baby Theresa: A
Prognosticator of Future Bioethics, 17 NOVA L. REV. 445, 451 (1992); Paliokas, supra
note 4, at 197.
8. P.A. Baird & A.D. Sadovnick, Survival in Infants with Anencephaly, 23
CLINICAL PEDIATRIcS 268, 270 (1984); see The Anencephalic as a Source for Pediatric
Organ Transplants: A Question of Medical Ethics: Hearings on Cal. S. 2018 Before the
Cal. Legislative Senate Subcomm. on the Rights of the Disabled 9, 64 (1986) [hereinafter
Subcommittee Hearings] (providing the testimony of Leslie Rothenberg, Adjunct Assistant
Professor of Medicine, and Director, Program in Medical Ethics, UCLA Medical Center).
Cases of unusually long survival are often erroneously diagnosed as anencephaly. Medical
Task Force on Anencephaly, The Infant with Anencephaly, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 669,
671 (1990) [hereinafter Medical Task Force]. See also Friedman, supra note 3, at 922.
9. See infra notes 14-16 and 25-30 and accompanying text; see also UNIF. DETERMI-
NATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 386 (1980 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter UDDA] (for
the definition of "determination of death"); John D. Arras & Shlomo Shinnar,
Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: A Critique, 259 JAMA 2284, 2285 (1988); see
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quality of life, anencephalic infants are living, breathing
human beings, deserving of comfort, respect, and bodily
integrity.
II. LEGAL AND ETHICAL OBJECTIONS TO ORGAN
PROCUREMENT FROM LIVE ANENCEPHALIC
INFANTS
Historically, lay and medical communities have forbidden
individuals to donate or sell their body parts while still alive.
Individuals are only legally authorized to donate one of their
paired organs, such as a kidney or lung to a needy recipient in
order to prevent the sale of organs or the exploitation of do-
nors.10 In most instances of organ donation, a physician will
seek a family's consent to donate a loved one's organs before or
at the time of death. The physician will then contact the local
organization coordinating organ transplantations to arrange the
logistics of extracting the organs,11 and assessing their suitabil-
ity of use. If the organs are designated healthy, all usable or-
gans are procured immediately upon death. The entire organ
selection process takes just a few hours since organs begin to
quickly deteriorate following natural death due to oxygen-dep-
rivation.12 This problem of the physiological deterioration of or-
also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & Bi-
OMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH (1981) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N, DEFINING DEATH]; Task Force on Brain Death in Children, Guidelines for the
Determination of Brain Death in Children: Report of the Task Force 246 JAMA 2184,
2185-86 (1981) [hereinafter Report of the Task Force]; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death: A Definition of
Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 337, 337-40 (1968) [hereinafter Harvard Committee Re-
port of 1968].
10. See Sharon Nan Perley, From Control Over One's Body To Control Over One's
Body Parts: Extending the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 335, 337
(discussing a patient's dignitary interest in her excised tissues, cells, and body parts for
medical research and use).
11. Organ procurement is arranged and performed through a local or regional divi-
sion of the United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS). The local division must be quali-
fied by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and operated ac-
cording to federal standards. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat.
2339 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (Supp. 1989)).
12. See, e.g., Beth Brandon, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors: A Question of
Life or Death, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 781, 792 (1990); Donald N. Medearis, Jr. &
Lewis B. Holmes, On the Use of Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors, 321 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 391, 391-93 (1989) (referring to the limited availability of healthy organs from
anencephalic infants); Medical Task Force, supra note 8, at 670; Michael R. Harrison,
The Anencephalic Newborn as Organ Donor, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1986, at 21.
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gans has prompted discussion about expanding the traditional,
legal definition of death to include anencephalic infants so that
their organs may be procured while the infants are still alive. 13
This proposal, however, raises a number of legal and ethical
concerns about the definitions of of "life," and "death," and
society's willingness to procure the organs of one individual
before death solely for the benefit of other persons.
A. The Current Statutory Definition of Death
In the United States, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA) requires that an individual be dead before his or her
organs may be procured. Section 1(1) clearly states that "ana-
tomic gifts can be made only after the donor has been declared
dead." '14 The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA)
defines death as either (1) the irreversible cessation of heart
rate and respiration or (2) total brain death.1 5 Since
anencephalic infants maintain both a heartbeat and respiration
without medical assistance, they do not fit the first prong of the
UDDA, the traditional cardio-respiratory medical definition of
death. Furthermore, since they have active brain stems, neither
do they satisfy the UDDA's second prong of whole brain
death.1 6 As a result, in recent years, it has been proposed that
13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
14. UNiF. ANATONOMICAL GIFT ACT § 1(I), 8a U.L.A. 47 (1987 & Supp. 1990)
[hereinafter UAGA]. The UAGA provides guidelines for human tissue and organ donation
and has been adopted by all 50 states and the District of Columbia. See also Jeffrey R.
Botkin, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors, 82 PEDIATRIcs 250, 252 (1988).
15. The UDDA was adopted in 1981 by the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and provides that
"[a]n individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and re-
spiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, includ-
ing the brain stem, is dead." UDDA § 1, 12 U.L.A. 386 (1980 & Supp. 1993). Like the
UAGA, the UDDA has been adopted in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. See
Arras & Shinnar, supra note 9, at 2285; Brandon, supra note 12, at 792. The UDDA has
replaced the "Harvard Criteria" developed in the Harvard Committee Report of 1968 as
an alternative definition of death for an individual artifically sustained by life support
mechanisms. The Harvard Committee identified four criteria: 1) unreceptivity and un-
responsivity; 2) no movement or breathing; 3) no reflexes; and 4) a flat electroencephalo-
gram. Harvard Committee Report of 1968, supra note 9, at 339. See also PRESIDENT'S
CoMW'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 5 (establishing whole brain death
as a solid objective standard for defining death on which physicians and philosophers could
agree).
16. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DEFINING DEATH, supra note 9; Arras & Shinnar, supra
note 9, at 2285; Peabody et al., supra note 3, at 344.
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the UDDA be amended to create a third category specifically
classifying anencephalic infants as "dead."
B. Legal and Ethical Problems with Amending the Uniform
Determination of Death Act
Some bioethicists have argued that the Uniform Determi-
nation of Death Act should be amended to declare
anencephalic infants legally dead immediately upon the medi-
cal diagnosis of anencephaly. 17 Such an amendment would en-
able organ procurement without the UDDA requirement of
cardio-respiratory death or total brain death.' 8 In 1986, State
Senator Milton Marks proposed an amendment to the Califor-
nia state legislature that stated "an individual born with the
condition of anencephaly is dead."' 9 The proposal failed and he
later revised its language after receiving sharp criticism for in-
troducing such a radical change in the definition of death and
violating the spirit of the UDDA. °
Amidst this country's ongoing philosophical struggle with
the concepts of life and death reflected in the abortion debate,
society does not seem equipped to change an already vague
concept of death to include a group of individuals who are still
living, breathing human beings. While, theoretically, it may be
easier for people to conceive that a baby born without much of
its brain is not really "alive," many people are not convinced
that a tiny baby with its eyes open and heart beating is already
17. See, e.g., Robert D. Truog & John C. Fletcher, Anencephalic Newborns: Can
Organs Be Transplanted Before Brain Death?, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 388, 388 (1989)
(encouraging the use of anencephalic organs as soon as the diagnosis of anencephaly is
confirmed).
18. Id. But see Capron, supra note 1, at 6. Capron, an opponent of anencephalic
organ procurement suggests that death is a single concept, not a two-part definition as the
UDDA suggests. He asserts that anencephalic infants are alive so they do not meet the
traditional cardiovascular definition of death or whole brain death. Id.
19. Cal. S. 2018, Reg. Sess. (1985-86) (sponsored by Sen. Marks). See also Peabody
et al., supra note 3, at 344. A similar bill was considered by the Florida state legislature in
1988 but failed in the House Health and Rehabilitative Services Subcommittee. See Fla.
H.R. 1089, Reg. Sess. (1988). The New Jersey legislature also considered a bill allowing
parents to donate their anencephalic infant's organs to needy recipients without meeting
the UAGA requirements, but this bill failed as well. See N.J. Assembly Bill 3367 (1986).
20. Capron, supra note 1, at 6 (stating that adding anencephalic infants to the defi-
nition of death would "radically change" the social and medical understanding and prac-
tices surrounding death). See generally Brandon, supra note 12, at 799-800 (stating that
changes in the UDDA would represent a marked departure from the legal and social con-
cepts of life and death, which would not be tolerated by society).
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dead.21 First, concluding that an individual with a spontaneous
heartbeat and respiration is "dead" would render the tradi-
tional cardio-pulmonary definition of death incorrect.22 Sec-
ondly, declaring anencephalic infants as "so close" to death to
be considered legally dead merely to increase the organ donor
pool, raises a number of important ethical objections. When the
Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society,
Ethics, and the Life Sciences analyzed proposals to change the
Harvard Criteria of death, they rejected this rationale as an
inappropriate and unjustifiable means for combatting the
shortage of pediatric organs in this country.23 In reaching their
conclusion, the Task Force was concerned about the following:
(1) reference to anencephalic infants being "brain absent" or
lacking "personhood," (2) emphasis on the quality of life over
the sanctity of life, and (3) the slippery slope effect.
1. The Concept of "Personhood"
Proponents of amending the UDDA advocate creating a
separate category for anencephalic infants because the infants
are "brain absent" and lack higher-brain activity, the key as-
pect of personhood.24 Those who support this position argue
that the definition of whole brain death revolves around this
concept of "higher-brain" death, or "cortical death."25 Since
anencephalic infants do not possess a cerebral cortex, it is ar-
gued that they are "brain-absent" and should not be given the
same moral value as other human beings.2 6 Since higher-brain
21. A visual inspection of an anencephalic infant's movements and reactions illus-
trate that the child is not "dead." See Koenig, supra note 7, at 449. As Beth Brandon has
stated, "[d]ying anencephalic infants are just that, dying: they are not dead." Brandon,
supra note 12, at 800.
22. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research rejected such a notion. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N,
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 5; see also Brandon, supra note 12, at
800.
23. The Task Force, upon evaluation of changing the definition of death based on a
need for organs, determined that the criteria for pronouncing an individual dead should be
completely independent of whether that person is an organ donor. Report of the Task
Force, supra note 9, at 299-300. See also Brandon, supra note 12, at 790 n.75.
24. See, e.g., Committee on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 1118; Koenig, supra note 7,
at 446; Medearis & Holmes, supra note 12, at 392.
25. Larry R. Churchill & Rosa Pinkus, The Use of Anencephalic Organs: Historical
and Ethical Dimensions, 68 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 147, 158-59 (1990). See Bran-
don, supra note 12, at 801.
26. See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 1118.
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functioning distinguishes humans from other species, an "irre-
versible absence of cognitive function" represents the "absence
of personhood. '2 7 It is also argued that because anencephalic
infants are not able to perform upper brain activities, such as
thinking, memory, affectivity, or consciousness, they should not
be afforded the same protection under the law as other human
beings.2 8 This line of reasoning is founded on the concept that
"all rights enumerated in the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights are predicated on consciousness, or the capacity of con-
sciousness, except for the right to life itself, which becomes
meaningless when consciousness can never exist, as in an
anencephalic infant. '2 9  Thus, the argument goes, since
anencephalic infants are "nonpersons," harming, wronging, or
using their organs before their natural death would not violate
any legal or ethical principle.8"
This point of view, however, overlooks the important fact
that anencephalic infants are not "brain-absent." Since these
infants possess a functional brain stem, their brain is not com-
pletely "absent." Yet, it is argued that since these infants lack
"personhood," they have no right to life.$' However, if these
infants lack personhood, then, under this rationale, many other
groups of individuals who are mentally debilitated or termi-
nally ill would fall under this category and be subject to the
involuntary procurement of their organs as well. 2 Clearly, such
a thought reflects a devaluation of life. Objectively, observation
shows that anencephalic infants possess "a remarkable hetero-
27. Id.; see also Churchill & Pinkus, supra note 25, at 160; Ronald Cranford &
David Smith, Consciousness: The Most Critical Moral (Constitutional) Standard for
Human Personhood, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 233 (1987); C. Ann Potter, Will the "Right to
Die" Become a License to Kill? The Growth of Euthanasia in America, 19 J. LEGIs. 31
(1993).
28. Churchill & Pinkus, supra note 25, at 160. See also Peter J. Riga, A Brief Life
That Could Save Others, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 27, 1992, at 15.
29. See, e.g., Cranford & Smith, supra note 27, at 247.
30. Churchill & Pinkus, supra note 25, at 160. Some even go so far as to say that
since the infant cannot consciously feel and is not "alive," "killing is therefore not an is-
sue." Trugg & Fletcher, supra note 17, at 390. See also Shewmon et al., supra note 1, at
1775.
31. Arras & Shinnar, supra note 9, at 2284; Shewmon, et al., supra note 1, at 1775
(contending that to harvest organs from anencephalic infants is to assert the philosophical
tenet that anencephalics are not human beings).
32. Shewmon et al., supra note 1, at 1775 (stating that such groups might include
terminally ill patients, death row inmates, and infants with fatal congenital diseases); see
infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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geneity of morphologic and functional features" that render
them a group of "persons" sharing like characteristics and
traits.33 Furthermore, although the definition of "personhood"
has not been fully resolved legally or philosophically,3 4 all indi-
viduals born alive are currently considered "persons" under the
law, including anencephalic infants. Only human embryos and
fetuses are not considered legal "persons" and do not receive
the protection of constitutional rights.3 5
2. Quality of Life versus Sanctity of Life
Closely related to the debate about personhood is the be-
lief that since anencephalic infants possess no ability to think
or feel, they have an extremely low quality of life that is not
worth preserving or respecting. Ironically, both proponents and
opponents of anencephalic infant organ donations place great
value on the concept of "saving life." Individuals who argue
that anencephalic infants should be considered "dead" desire to
save the lives of children awaiting organ transplants, while op-
ponents ground their beliefs on saving the lives of the
anencephalic infants themselves. This debate seems to focus on
an argument between those who place value on the "quality" of
life versus those who emphasize the "sanctity" of all life.
Because anencephalic infants will never revive from a per-
manently unconscious state, never communicate with the world,
and never think or speak, some believe they live a low quality
of life that is not even worth living. Yet, observation shows that
these infants, like other infants, sleep, eat, breathe, smile, and
cry."6 Although such a life invariably fails to meet the subjec-
tive standard of a "high" quality life, it is still a life that should
be protected. Religious and ethical beliefs support the idea that
33. Medearis & Holmes, supra note 12, at 392.
34. No agreement currently exists among philosophers, physicians, or the public as
to what characteristics constitute personhood. This discord is clearly evidenced by the abor-
tion debate, much of which revolves around the concept of whether a fetus should be con-
sidered a "person." Alexander L. Caplan, Should Fetuses or Infants be Utilized as Organ
Donors?, BioEmcs, Apr. 1987, at 119, 123.
35. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 27, at 41-42 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), in which the court stated that "the word 'person' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include the unborn.").
36. See supra note 21. See also Dan Allison, Anencephalic Babies Must Not Die to
Serve Others, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 1, 1992, at 2 (stating that the life of the
anencephalic infant belongs to the infant, "and [is] no one else['s] to take.").
1995]
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all life should be valued, and that God, fate, or a force other
than another human being should determine the precise mo-
ment of death.87 Respect for the symbolic value and dignity of
all life imposes moral and legal constraints on the killing of
individuals who may be perceived as less significant or less val-
uable to society. All individuals, no matter how debilitated,
have a right to bodily integrity. It is when we as a society begin
to draw lines as to which life is subjectively meaningful to soci-
ety that the worth and value of all human life becomes
threatened, and the right to bodily integrity becomes
meaningless.
3. Fear of the Slippery Slope
Considering anencephalic infants "dead" or "close enough
to death" instills in the public a fear that other individuals very
near death also will be declared dead and will be killed for the
sake of procuring their organs. If the UAGA or state statutes
are amended to require anencephalic infants to become organ
donors, it is believed that other individuals with neural tube
anomolies or debilitating cognitive deficiencies also may be
forced to become organ donors before their natural deaths. 8
Specifically, the "slippery slope" would lead most directly to
those infants born with hydroencephaly89 and microencephaly' 0
as becoming forced organ donors. This position could then ex-
tend to other groups of people similarly situated who possess
only limited cognitive functioning or who arguably lack a
"valid" interest in life, including death row inmates, adults in a
permanently vegetative state, individuals with Alzheimer's dis-
37. See In re Baby "K," 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1993), afl'd, 16 F.3d
590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994) [hereinafter Baby K] (stating the reli-
gious grounds on which Baby K's mother desired not to have her anencephalic child deter-
mined "dead" so that her organs could be procured).
38. Arras & Shinnar, supra note 9, at 2285 (hydroencephalic infants and those with
other congenital neural anomolies); Committee on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 1118 (perma-
nently unconscious patients); Shewmon et al., supra note 1, at 1775 ("incompetent patients
in the final stages of a terminal illness or even prisoners on death row").
39. Hydroencephaly is a congenital neural condition where the cranium becomes fil-
led with fluid during gestation, taking the place of the cerebral hemispheres. THOMAS L.
STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY; A VOCABULARY OF MEDICINE AND ITS AL-
UED SOURCES, 964-66 (Jacob A. Stein ed., 1972).
40. Microencephaly is a congenital neural condition whereby the infant is born with
a very small head which constrains the growth of the brain. Id.
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ease, or incompetent individuals with terminal illnesses.41 To
declare as dead many of these groups whom the general popu-
lation perceive to be very much alive could jeopardize the ethi-
cal integrity of the medical profession and decrease public trust
in medicine.4 Many individuals also would become even more
skeptical of organ donation. While some groups have tried to
minimize the fear of a slippery slope by arguing that "safe-
guards" would prevent groups of individuals other than
anencephalic infants from being affected by an amendment to
the UDDA,'43 any "safeguard" would not be sufficient. Once
"very fine distinctions [are made] regarding the dying, ' 44 the
risk of descending down the slippery slope becomes significant.
C. Legal and Ethical Problems with Amending the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act
Besides amending the UDDA, some groups also have pro-
posed amending the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) to
allow the organ procurement from anencephalic infants imme-
diately upon birth.'5 The UAGA provides guidelines which al-
low an individual to make an anatomical gift of his or her own
organs or tissue "upon or after death."'46 Since the UAGA pro-
vision only applies to competent adults who are able to decide
whether to donate their organs and tissue upon death, the
UAGA has provided that the "next of kin" have the authority
41. See, e.g., Arras & Shinnar, supra note 9, at 2285 (infants with congenital neural
anomolies and those in a permanently vegetative state); Brandon, supra note 12, at 802
(those in a permanently vegetative state, the mentally retarded, or those with Alzheimer's
disease); Medearis & Holmes, supra note 12, at 392 (prisoners on death row, incompetent
patients in a permanently vegatative state, and those with organ failure); Shewmon et al.,
supra note 1, at 1775 (terminally ill patients, death row inmates, and infants with fatal
congenital illnesses).
42. Botkin, supra note 14, at 254 (expressing concern for the "gradual exploitation"
of medicine and society); Diane Gianelli, Calling Anencephalic Donors Dead; Can
Anencephalic Infants be Declared Dead at Birth So That Their Organs Can Be Trans-
planted?, AM. MED. Naws, June 29, 1992, at 2.
43. Truog & Fletcher, supra note 17, at 390 (stating that some UDDA amendment
proposals would specifically exclude hydroencephaly, microencephaly, permanently vegeta-
tive state, and various chromosomal abnormalities).
44. Gianelli, supra note 42, at 2.
45. See, e.g., Medearis & Holmes, supra note 12, at 391; Shewmon et al., supra note
1, at 1775.
46. UAGA § 2, 8a U.L.A. 47 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
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to determine whether their minor child's organs may be used
for organ donation upon death.4
Under the UAGA, however, organs may not be procured
until an anencephalic infant has died.4 8 Those who have pro-
posed that the UAGA be amended want to allow the extraction
of hearts, livers, kidneys, and other usable organs from
anencephalic infants before death. 9 Since these infants are
alive, however, this proposal would cause the infants essentially
to be killed in order to procure their organs. It is argued that
the procurement of the organs is justified since the parents' dig-
nitary interests as the next of kin who wish to donate their
child's organs become frustrated while waiting for the infant to
die naturally since the organs deteriorate and become unsuita-
ble for donation.50
There are two major ethical implications with passing an
amendment allowing the immediate procurement of organs
from anencephalic infants under the UAGA. First, killing a
human being who is still alive is considered murder in every
state in this country. Second, extracting organs from one
human being for another person's use raises important ethical
considerations regarding the use of one individual as the means
to an end for another.
1. Killing for the Purpose of Procuring Organs
Advocates of amending the UAGA to allow anencephalic
organ donation argue that since anencephalic infants are not
"persons," they are not "alive," '51 and therefore they are not
really "killed" when their organs are removed. Based upon this
reasoning, however, it would follow that other persons exper-
47. Section 3(a) of the UAGA provides that decision-making authority for organ
donation goes to family members, in the following order: (1) the spouse of the decedent;
(2) an adult son or daughter of the decedent; (3) either parent of the decedent; (4) an
adult brother or sister of the decedent; (5) a grandparent of the decedent; or (6) the guard-
ian of the person of the decedent at the time of death. Since an infant obviously does not
have a spouse or adult son or daughter, the infant's parents are given priority in consenting
to donation of the infant's organs. UAGA § 3a, 8a U.L.A. 47 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
48. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
49. Medearis & Holmes, supra note 12, at 392.
50. See, e.g., Brandon, supra note 12, at 787-88 (explaining that parents' interests
are sometimes frustrated by the current state of the law). See also supra note 12 regarding
organ deterioration.
51. See, e.g., Truog & Fletcher, supra note 17, at 390. See also supra notes 25-35
and accompanying text for a discussion of "personhood."
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iencing severe cognitive disabilities, terminal illness, or immi-
nent death are not truly "alive" either, and thus would not be
"killed" if their heart rate and breathing were artifically
stopped to procure their organs. 2
It is further argued that organs of anencephalic infants
should only be removed if the parents' motivations are to help
save the lives of other children.53 Yet, if the desire to act with
unselfish charity is a motivator for declaring an anencephalic
infant as dead, this argument would logically extend to other
groups as well, such as those with hydroencephaly or
microencephaly, or those born in a permanent vegetative state.
This logic also would include the adult population, who could
allow live donors to be killed so that they may charitably "do-
nate" their organs to a needy person. Not only is fear of this
slippery slope very real, but the idea of killing a living, breath-
ing human being to procure organs for the purpose of increas-
ing a potentially usable organ pool is immoral and should not
be permitted.
2. The Use of Anencephalic Infants as a Means to an End
No group of human beings exists solely to serve the needs
of another group. Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative
"calls for humans to be treated as ends in themselves, and
never solely as a means to an end."'5 4 Those who strongly be-
lieve that anencephalic infants are not "humans" also believe
that using these infants to benefit other people does not violate
Kant's Categorical Imperative since utilitarian theory dictates
that society benefits when the greatest good is provided to the
greatest number of people.55 This utilitarian principle, however,
violates the medical commitment to preserving life. The first
52. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text; Arras & Shinnar, supra note 9, at
2284; see also Brandon, supra note 12, at 802.
53. Koenig, supra note 7, at 472. However, altruism may be mistaken for motiva-
tions arising out of "ambivalence, depression, hidden problems, fear, erroneous perceptions,
and misconceptions." Churchill & Pinkus, supra note 25, at 156.
54. A number of authors and bioethicists have addressed this issue. Arras & Shin-
nar, supra note 9, at 2284; Brandon, supra note 12, at 802; see Friedman, supra note 3, at
917; Truog & Fletcher, supra note 17, at 390.
55. In particular, see Truog & Fletcher, supra note 17, at 390 (stating that since the
anencephalic infant is not "alive," Kant's dictum is not violated).
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and foremost principle of medical ethics is to preserve life. 6 It
should be the continued goal of the medical profession to pro-
vide comfort and care to all individuals for the duration of their
lives and to protect the personal integrity of their bodies.57
Treating anencephalic infants differently from other patients
with debilitating conditions because their lives are shorter, and
their bodies as mere "receptacles for organs," is not only an
unethical violation of the Hippocratic Oath but also a violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act and other moral codes.58
Aside from these two important ethical objections, the do-
nor's dignitary interest in donating the anencephalic infant's
organs should be given the same recognition as the interests of
other incompetent donors.5" Moving the date of procurement
from the date of death to the date of birth does not necessarily
alleviate the claimed frustrations of the anencephalic infant's
next of kin. To have any successful organ transplant, the or-
gans first must be screened and found suitable for an available
recipient. Consequently, amending the UAGA invokes concern
not only about killing infants while they are still very much
alive, but does not resolve the logistical and compatibility
problems experienced by all organ donors.
56. The medical commitment to preserving life is grounded upon the Hippocratic
Oath which every physician swears to follow to become licensed as a medical practitioner.
The Hippocratic Oath states, in pertinent part:
I swear ... I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and
judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing.... I will keep pure
and holy both my life and my art .... Into whatsoever house I enter, I will enter
to help the sick, and I will abstain from all intentional wrongdoing and harm....
Now if I carry out this oath, and break it not, may I gain forever reputation
among all men for my life and for my art; but if I transgress it and forswear
myself, may the opposite befall me.
EMMANUEL S. KIAPOKAS, ANALYSIS OF THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH 13-15 (A. Hatzinikolaou
trans., Athens 1983). See also Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 11, at 419.
57. See Brandon, supra note 12, at 800-01 (discussing the objections to the utilita-
rian ideas that are commonly cited as justifications for anencephalic organ donations).
58. Id. at 802. Treating individuals differently from others based on their disabilities
violates the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
1990). See infra note 61-68 and accompanying text.
59. See Perley, supra note 10, at 348 (stating that all human beings retain a moral,
dignitary interest in organs removed from one's body).
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D. Recent Common Law Treatment of Anencephalic
Infants
Much of the debate over organ procurement is closely re-
lated to the standard practice of withholding active or intrusive
medical treatment from anencephalic infants. Recent court de-
cisions have supported the belief that the life of an
anencephalic infant is sacred and is worthy of protection under
the law. Courts have stated, however, that maintaining the life
of an anencephalic infant does not warrant application of futile
medical treatments, but rather, requires only "comfort care."60
In the two recent cases of Baby K and Baby Theresa, courts
have examined constitutional issues and statutory provisions
and determined that the lives of anencephalic infants should be
protected by law.
1. Other Statutory Concerns - The Emergency Medical
Treatment Active Labor Act, The Americans with Disabilities
Act, The Rehabilitative Act of 1973, and In re Baby K
The recent ruling of In re Baby K by the United States
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,"' raises issues about three
federal statutes: the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA),62 the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA),6S and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Reha-
bilitation Act)."4 All three statutes prohibit discrimination in
one form or another against recipients of medical care. EM-
TALA is a federal anti-discrimination act requiring hospitals
to screen and provide stabilizing treatment to individuals in
"emergency medical conditions" before transferring them to
other hospitals or releasing them.65 The recently enacted ADA
60. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text for a discussion of comfort care and
futile medical treatment.
61. 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1985 & Supp. 1993).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter ADA].
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. 1993). EMTALA defines an "emergency medical
condition" as "a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient sever-
ity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in (i) placing the health of the individual . . . in serious
jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any
bodily organ or part." Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A).
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prohibits disability-based discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, including hospitals, 6 and the Rehabilitation Act
prohibits discrimination against an "otherwise qualified" dis-
abled individual, solely by reason of his or her disability, for
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 67
Each Act protects disabled individuals, including anencephalic
infants, from being denied processes, benefits, and services of-
fered to other recipients of medical care.68
In Baby K, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia ruled that denying an anencephalic in-
fant medical treatment violates the EMTALA, the ADA, and
the Rehabilitation Act, and other state and federal statutes.69
The court held that because Baby K is considered a "handi-
capped" and "disabled" individual born with a congenital de-
fect 70 and entered the hospital in an "emergency medical con-
dition" of respiratory failure, 71 she could not be denied medical
treatment.7 2 Although the standard treatment of anencephalic
infants is only to provide the comfort care of nutrition, hydra-
tion, and warmth, 3 the court ruled the hospital had a duty
under EMTALA to use aggressive treatment to stabilize the
emergency condition, 4 and treat Baby K in the same manner
as any other individual suffering an emergency respiratory
problem. By deferring to the legislative intent of these statutes,
the court protected the anencephalic infant from discriminatory
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12182.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
68. See Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnoses and Discrimination Discriminatory Non-
treatment of Infants with HIV Infection, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1581, 1582-90 (1993)
(describing the legal status of the "selective non-treatment of newborns").
69. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1031.
70. Id.'at 1027. See also Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 624 (1986)
(stating that the definition of "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to in-
clude an individual born with a congenital defect).
71. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026.
72. Id. at 1031.
73. See supra notes 5-6 and 60 and accompanying text; see also Johnson v. Thomp-
son, 971 F.2d 1487, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that physicians were not liable for
breach of duty for administering only "comfort" or supportive care to an infant with spina
bifida and anencephaly since the infant, like most anencephalic infants, would not have
survived with the application of vigorous treatment, nor would her underlying defects have
been cured).
74. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1028. The statute recognizes that while hospitals and
medical practitioners do not have a duty to provide aggressive means to treat anencephaly,
they do have the duty to provide "stabilizing medical treatment" for any emergency medi-
cal condition. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A).
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treatment and emphasized the importance of the sanctity of the
infant's life. This decision exhibited respect for Baby K's bodily
integrity by requiring physicians to treat her for her emergency
condition, rather than allowing her to die so that her organs
might be used for transplantation to other children as some
hoped.
2. The Court's Refusal to Allow Organ Procurement from
Anencephalic "Baby Theresa"
In the somewhat similar widely publicized, landmark case
of In re T.A.C.P., parents of an anencephalic infant called
"Baby Theresa" requested that Florida courts declare her brain
dead upon birth to allow her organs to be removed immediately
for donation.75 Baby Theresa's parents had learned during
pregnancy that Theresa would be born with anencephaly. They
specifically decided to carry the fetus to term for the sole pur-
pose of donating her organs to another child, and even ar-
ranged for a Cesarean section delivery to prevent any damage
to the organs during the birth process. The family claimed that
it was ethically appropriate to remove Baby Theresa's organs
upon birth because anencephaly is "incompatible with life."' 76
The Florida Supreme Court, however, refused to declare the
infant brain dead because under Florida law an individual may
not be declared dead until there is irreversible cessation of cir-
culatory and respiratory functions, or until all activity of the
brain stem ceases.7 7 By the time Baby Theresa died naturally
nine days after her birth, her organs had already begun to dete-
riorate and were not suitable for donation.
Baby Theresa's parents defended their request on constitu-
tional and common law grounds. They argued that the consti-
tutional right to privacy, the right to the free exercise of reli-
gion, the common law right to bodily integrity, the right to
patient autonomy, and their rights as parental guardians ena-
bled them to make medical decisions for their incompetent
75. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1992).
76. See also Daniel Avila, Medical Treatment Rights of Older Persons and Persons
With Disabilities, IssuEs IN LAw & MED., Mar. 22, 1993, at 29 (citing Trial Transcript at
57-59, In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1992)).
77. Fla. Stat. ch. 382.009(l) (1991) (providing the UDDA requirements for death);




child .7 The court disagreed with each of these rationales. The
court upheld the medical standard that when a patient cannot
choose non-treatment for herself, the presumption of life man-
dates treatment. The Florida court held that although parents
have the privacy right to make decisions about nurturing and
raising a minor child, the constitutional right to privacy does
not extend to the extraction of organs that are necessary for
support of the child's own life.7 9 The court stated it could not
"authorize someone to take [a] baby's life, however short, how-
ever unsatisfactory, to save another child." 80 Like Baby K, this
decision provides that under the common law and statutory
law, anencephalic infants are to be protected from organ pro-
curement until the time of their natural deaths."'
III. MEDICAL PROPOSALS AND UNCERTAINTIES
A. Four Proposals for Obtaining Organs from Anencephalic
Infants
To be transplanted, an organ must be healthy and must be
suitable for donation. The organ must function satisfactorily
and be free from anomalies that would cause a chance of rejec-
tion by the organ recipient. Since the cause of anencephaly and
other neural tube defects are believed to be multiple and unde-
termined, 2 it is difficult for physicians to determine the suita-
bility of the organs and preserve them for transplantation.8"
Physicians, attorneys, and ethicists have cumulatively proposed
four different methods for medically sustaining anencephalic
infants in attempt to best prevent anencephalic organs from un-
dergoing irreversible deterioration and hypoxic injury.84 The
four proposals are as follows:
78. Trial Transcript at 43-44, In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1992).
79. The court clarified that the constitutional right to privacy applies to Baby The-
resa regarding the decisions she would make about her own medical treatment, were she
able, but it does not apply directly to decisions made by Baby Theresa's parents that are
not in the best interests of the infant. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.2d at 593 n.9.
80. Avila, supra note 76 (citing Trial Transcript, at 57-59, In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.2d
588 (Fla. 1992)).
81. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1022.
82. See, e.g., Medearis & Holmes, supra note 12, at 391.
83. D. Alan Shewmon, Anencephaly: Selected Medical Aspects, HASTINGS CENTER
RaP., Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 11, 11.
84. Committee on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 1116-17.
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1. Resuscitating the infant at birth and maintaining its life
with intensive care until total brain death or natural death
occurs.
8 5
2. Providing medical care to the infant until vital signs
show impending cardio-respiratory death. At a point just before
death, the infant is monitored and given maximum life support
to preserve the organs until total brain death or natural brain
death occurs.
3. Gradually "cooling" the anencephalic infant's body
temperature to help preserve the organs. Although the infant's
death is actually hastened by the cooling of its body, the
claimed intention of the process is to preserve the infant's or-
gans for transplantation and not to kill the infant."6
4. Procuring organs from anencephalic infants before total
brain death or natural death occurs. The rationale for this ap-
proach is that anencephalic infants are "brain-absent" and thus
may be treated as though they were brain dead.8
Because an anencephalic infant is expected to have only a
short life span, it is argued that these methods of providing life
support or cooling the infant's body temperature would not be
too costly or too burdensome upon hospitals, physicians, staffs,
or families. Certainly it would not be more costly than main-
taining any other individual on life support. Yet, while each of
these methods may seem appealing to attempt to preserve
much needed organs for children awaiting transplants, they are
rarely successful due to problems with the efficacy and suitabil-
85. The study conducted at the Loma Linda Medical Center provided intensive care
to six anencephalic infants from the date of birth until the infants met the legal criteria for
total brain death. The average length of time necessary to maintain an infant until brain
death is seven to fourteen days, however, only one of six infants became totally brain dead
within the first seven days. Six babies were provided routine comfort care until signs of
imminent death appeared, at which time the infants were given artificial respiration and
intensive care to attempt to preserve their organs. Yet, no solid organs were procured for
transplantation due to a lack of availability of specific recipients. Gianelli, supra note 42,
at 2 (citing statements by Dr. Joyce Peabody, the head of the Loma Linda study);
Peabody, supra note 2, at 345-46.
86. Justified by the "doctrine of double effect," a procedure which causes simultane-
ous positive and negative results is generally regarded as beneficial and not negative, so
long as the positive effect is intended. Thus, preserving the organs is treated as the intended
effect and the death of the infant is viewed as only an unfortunate associated effect. See
Committee on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 1116.
87. This method is the most controversial approach and has been used in West Ger-
many. Id. at 1117; see also Medearis & Holmes, supra note 12, at 392.
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ity of the organs, and misdiagnosis of the anencephalic
condition.
B. Problems with Efficacy and Suitability
For each of the first three methods described above, the
infant first must be declared brain dead, or have died naturally,
and the infant's organs must be healthy and medically accept-
able for transplant. These requirements are more challenging
to satisfy than might be expected. First, it is sometimes difficult
to obtain a declaration of brain death. A medical determination
of brain death is not usually made until an infant is at least
seven days old since a child is still developing during the first
week of life.88 Second, no set criteria exist for determining
brain death in children that are only newborn.8 9 Neurological
criteria used in older children is not as effective for very young
anencephalic infants because they are not as fully developed as
other infantsY0 Furthermore, the duration of the infant's life is
difficult to predict accurately, which is particularly stressful for
parents who are making decisions about organ donation and at-
tempting to arrange the logistics of an organ transplant.
Furthermore, many internal organs are medically unsuita-
ble for organ donation. The organs of an anencephalic infant
which suffer inadequate perfusion and a lack of oxygen contain
anomalies rendering the organ unfit for donation. 9' The 1987-
88 Loma Linda Medical School study showed that
anencephalic infants are not practical sources for organ trans-
plantations because of these numerous organ anomalies.92 In
the study, only one of the twelve attempts to procure usable
organs from anencephalic infants was successful.93 In another
study conducted at Brigham and Women's Hospital between
88. Committee on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 1117 (citing the Department of Health
and Human Services Task Force on the Determination of Brain Death in Children, which
recommends that the brain death criteria be limited to infants seven days or older).
89. Id.; see, e.g., Arras & Shinnar, supra note 9, at 2284; Report of the Task Force,
supra note 8, at 298-300.
90. Committee on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 1117.
91. Committee on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 1116; see also Paliokas, supra note 4,
at 197 (stating that owing to the absence of higher brain capacity, the infant "forgets" to
breathe, causing deprivation of blood and oxygen to the organs).
92. Peabody et aL, supra note 3, at 345-46, 350; see also supra note 85 and accom-
panying comments.
93. The study showed that when only routine care was provided, the organs deterio-
rated beyond use. When aggressive care was provided upon birth, the organs remained
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1972 and 1988, there were major anomalies in the organs of
seven of the thirty-nine anencephalic infants, which totaled
18 % of the anencephalic infants. The quality of these vital
organs were eroded even further by maintenance on life sup-
port machines.95
Roughly 60% of anencephalic infants' organs will be too
small to be transplanted due to premature birth or complica-
tions in the womb such as intrauterine growth retardation. 6 Of
the infants who are potentially suitable as organ donors, many
will be aborted due to the increased technological abilities to
detect neural tube defects during the early stages of preg-
nancy. 7 Based on this information, there will be fewer suitable
organs to procure from anencephalic infants as the years pass.
Given the small number of anecephalic infants born each year,
compared with the thousands of pediatric organs needed, the
difficulty with organ compatibility, timing, and transportation
make procuring organs from anencephalic infants unsuitable,
inefficacious, and simply impractical.
C. Problems of Misdiagnosis
Error in diagnosis of anencephaly is of significant concern.
Since anencephaly falls on a continuum with other serious con-
genital neural defects such as microencephaly and
hydroencephaly, anencephaly is often difficult to accurately
identify.98 To justify changing the UDDA definition of death or
amending the UAGA to include anencephalic infants as organ
donors it is absolutely necessary to maintain a high level of ac-
curacy in the diagnosis of the condition. It is too risky to label
an entire class of human being as legally dead without identify-
ing their condition with medical certainty. Even the most able
of physicians may disagree as to the diagnosis. The need for
accuracy is predicated on the slippery slope doctrine, as it is
healthy, but only one infant met the criteria for brain death, and at that time, no recipient
was found to accept those organs. Peabody et al., supra note 3, at 345-46, 350.
94. Medearis & Holmes, supra note 12, at 391.
95. Truog & Fletcher, supra note 17, at 390.
96. Brandon, supra note 12, at 805.
97. Medearis & Holmes, supra note 12, at 392 (stating that "too many errors have
been made for the diagnosis to be considered reliable as a legal definition of death"). See
also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
98. See Brandon, supra note 12, at 804 (stating that while anencephaly is obvious in
some cases, there are still many instances where it is not as apparent).
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essential to insure that other infants with less severe neural
anomolies are not misdiagnosed as anencephalic, either inno-
cently or intentionally, since their organs then also could be
procured for transplant before their natural or brain deaths
occur.
CONCLUSION
Indeed, it is true that changing the law to include
anencephalic infants as organ donors before natural death or
brain death may benefit some children anxiously awaiting or-
gan transplants. Amending the law may also help our society
redistribute precious and costly medical resources to those in-
fants who have a greater chance of survival. Yet proposals to
amend the UDDA or the UAGA are based on a motivation to
satisfy a market economy and to meet the demand of organ
shortages by increasing the supply of organs. These motivations
may be noble to some, and even wise to others, but the means
by which this goal is to be achieved are simply immoral.
Anencephalic infants are not dead. Their organs should not be
procured until they have died or have been diagnosed as brain
dead. Until then, they are living, breathing human beings and
should be treated with respect and dignity.
At the heart of this debate are questions about the princi-
ples of "life" and "death." Some people define life by a heart-
beat. Others define it as cognitive functioning. When it comes
to decision making about newborn babies and parenting, per-
sonal and religious values play a large role. In a society where
individuals are already skeptical about organ donation and
drawing lines around the concepts of life and death, very few
seem eager to think or speak in absolutes. More realistically,
society is not comfortable with labeling as "dead" a group of
infants who are already condemned to such a short and simple
life. So until philosophers, bioethicists, lawmakers, and public
citizens are able to find a middle ground or reach a consensus
about these emotional issues, it is best to defend these newborn
infants and protect their interests, and all human beings' inter-
ests, in bodily integrity, personal dignity, and in life.
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